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This paper offers several contributions to actual research and discussion on monetary
policy. It clariﬁes the relationship between uncertainty of inﬂation persistence and op-
timal monetary policy and discusses the consequences of the recent Blanchard proposal
to implement a higher inﬂation target in the light of parameter uncertainty. Further-
more, it provides insights of general interest on the methodological level by analyzing
the interrelations between normalization of variables and their independence proper-
ties and by extending standard solution methods of dynamic programming problems to
non-orthogonal parameter uncertainty.
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While the traditional view on parameter uncertainty comes to the conclusion that mon-
etary policy should be more cautious than under certainty equivalence, one important
exception is the case of uncertainty about the persistence of inﬂation, where optimal
policy is found to be more aggressive. However, this result seems to be unclear in the
case of strict inﬂation targeting. The ﬁndings by Craine (1979) imply greater aggres-
sion, whereas Söderström (2002) ﬁnds certainty equivalence. This paper reconciles
the discrepancy in the literature by thorough examination of the interdependencies be-
tween normalization and imposing independence assumptions. Since both procedures
are commonly used in economic analysis, the ﬁndings are of general interest from a
methodological point of view. By extending the solution method of the standard lin-
ear regulator problem to multiplicative uncertainty in conjunction with non-orthogonal
residuals, it is shown that Söderström’s result stems from a certain combination of nor-
malizing and imposing the independence assumption. In general, optimal monetary
policy under uncertainty about the persistence of inﬂation is found to be not certainty
equivalent, even in a strict inﬂation targeting framework. In fact, the neutral stance of
monetary policy is affected by uncertainty and differs from its certainty equivalent value.
The direction of this deviation depends on the covariance between inﬂation persistence
and the inﬂation shock. This ﬁnding is not restricted to the strict inﬂation targeting case
and therefore has wider implications. Some of these are highlighted by an application to
the recent proposal by Blanchard et al. (2010) to increase the inﬂation target from 2 to
4 percent. It is demonstrated that this target shift in combination with uncertainty about
inﬂation persistence leads to a higher neutral policy interest rate than under certainty
equivalence. Conversely, for any reduction of the inﬂation target, inﬂation persistence
uncertainty would support a lower neutral rate. Thus, inﬂation persistence uncertainty
has interesting diametrical effects in the case of a change in the inﬂation target: For
any shift toward a tighter regime, it supports the “doves” in the central bank’s decision
committee, while for any loosening in the inﬂation target it gives backup to the “hawks”.1 Uncertainty about the Persistence of Inﬂation
Over the past decade, research on monetary policy under uncertainty has brought im-
portant insights. As Bernanke (2008) points out, one of the major results is, that the
cautious response to economic shocks suggested by analysis in the tradition of Brainard
(1967) is not always appropriate. An important exception to the “Brainard Conser-
vatism Principle” (Blinder, 1998, p.17) arises in the case of uncertainty about the per-
sistence of inﬂation. While the conservatism conclusion is generally valid for uncertain
monetary policy transmission parameters, uncertainty about inﬂation persistence may
make the optimal policy response more aggressive.
This result dates back to Craine (1979), who analyzes parameter uncertainty in an
univariate model context, and was conﬁrmed more recently in modeling frameworks of
higher complexity by Söderström (2002), Moessner (2005) and Kimura and Kurozumi
(2007). While the latter studies explore the consequences of parameter uncertainty
in micro-founded models with forward-looking expectations, Söderström (2002) shows
the optimality of a more aggressive policy in the case of uncertainty about inﬂation
persistence in the purely backward-looking model context of Ball (1997) and Svensson
(1997, 1999).
However, to reach this result, Söderström needs a strictly positive weight on output
gap stabilization in the central banks loss function. Turning from this “ﬂexible inﬂation
targeting” regime toward “strict inﬂation targeting” in the sense of Svensson (1999),
i.e. assuming a zero-weight on output, optimal policy under uncertainty about inﬂa-
tion persistence is certainty equivalent. This ﬁnding seems to be at odds with the one
obtained by Craine (1979) who considers only one target variable and whose analysis
is thus comparable with the strict inﬂation targeting case. Craine takes output as the
target variable which is modeled as being linearly dependent on its ﬁrst lag and the
monetary policy instrument (the money growth rate). In the case of uncertainty about
output dynamics, he ﬁnds a more aggressive policy to be optimal. This manifests itself
in lower average money growth and thus tighter monetary policy than under certainty
equivalence.
Empirical research on inﬂation persistence shows little consensus about its degree,
so there is a substantial amount of uncertainty about inﬂation dynamics.1 The issue of
its implications for optimal monetary policy is therefore of major importance. Hence,
the apparent discrepancy in the results motivates the search for an explanation.
This paper offers a solution for this puzzle and shows how the Söderström (2002)
framework can be expanded to a more general analysis of the case of strict inﬂation
1See for example the overview on the results of the Eurosystem Inﬂation Persistence Network by
Altissimo et al. (2006).
1targeting. As transformations of variables usually alter the covariances between model
parameters and residuals, it turns out that the conventional assumption of indepen-
dence between model parameters and residuals can not be imposed without hesita-
tion, if the model variables are normalized. Söderström normalizes the inﬂation rate
and the nominal interest rate to zero mean variables by subtracting the respective long
run average values and assumes that the parameters and residuals of the transformed
model are independent. This implies, that there are non-zero covariances in the orig-
inal non-normalized model. If the ordering is changed, so that one starts with a non-
normalized model with independent parameters and residuals, the demeaning of vari-
ables will change the covariance between the parameter of inﬂation persistence and the
inﬂation-shock (in fact, the covariance will increase). As Brainard (1967) noted and
more recent research conﬁrmed (see for example Martin, 1999; Gonzalez, 2008) non-
zero covariances can alter the effects of parameter uncertainty on optimal policy. Since
the procedures of normalizing variables and imposing independence are widely used
in economic analysis, these ﬁndings are also of general interest on the methodological
level.
It is shown that the combination of normalizing and the assumption of independence
in Söderström (2002) leads to a special condition for the covariance between the param-
eter of inﬂation persistence and the inﬂation-shock, which implies certainty equivalence
for the case of strict inﬂation targeting, and that any other speciﬁcation leads to an opti-
mal policy that is not certainty equivalent. The solution of the optimization problem for
the case of non-orthogonality between parameters and residuals requires further gener-
alizations of standard dynamic programming techniques than multiplicative uncertainty
alone and thus represents the second methodological contribution of this paper.
In general, parameter uncertainty is shown to cause the neutral policy interest rate2
to deviate from its value under certainty. For the non-normalized model with inde-
pendence between parameters and residuals, optimal monetary policy shows a higher
neutral policy rate and thus the policy maker ﬁghts inﬂation more aggressively. This
“hawkish policy” result is hence again in line with Craine (1979). Moreover, this effect
of uncertainty about persistence on the neutral policy rate is not restricted to the strict
inﬂation targeting case but can also be found for any ﬂexible inﬂation targeting regime.
It thus may be questioned, which ordering of normalization and assuming indepen-
dence is the “right one”. In this paper it is argued, that this question has an ambiguous
answer. The implication of parameter uncertainty on the neutral rate depends on the
value for the covariance. Any independence assumption, whether made before or after
normalization, determines a certain covariance. The point is, that this covariance can
2The neutral policy interest rate is measured by the policy rate that is set when inﬂation is at target
and the output gap is zero.
2change and thus may cause implications of inﬂation persistence uncertainty as described
above.
To illustrate this result, the modeling framework is used to analyze the recent Blan-
chard et al. (2010) proposition to increase the inﬂation target from 2 to 4 percent. It
is shown that the new target requires a different normalization process which increases
the covariance between inﬂation persistence parameter and inﬂation shock. This leads
to a shift in the neutral rate to a higher value than under certainty equivalence. So tak-
ing uncertainty into account will back up the monetary policy “hawks” and the central
bank will gain an even higher policy scope than Blanchard et al. (2010) suggest. This
conclusion is symmetric, for there are, of course, also situations possible with opposing
effects. Any reduction of the inﬂation target, for example, will lead to a decreasing co-
variance and hence increasing parameter uncertainty may lead to a lower neutral stance
than under certainty equivalence, giving support to the “doves”.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the modeling frame-
work, section 3 studies the interrelations between normalization and the independence
assumption. In section 4 the implications of inﬂation persistence uncertainty with re-
versed ordering of normalization and independence assumption are analyzed, section 5
discusses the results and highlights their implications for the Blanchard proposal, sec-
tion 6 concludes.
2 The Model
The Söderström (2002) study uses the following model, which is a version of the (Svens-
son, 1997, 1999) model, consisting of two structural equations:
First, there is a Phillips-curve relationship between inﬂation ˆ pt+1 and the output gap
yt:
(1) ˆ pt+1 = at+1 ˆ pt +bt+1yt +hp
t+1
Inﬂation is measured as deviation from long run average inﬂation (which is assumed
to equal the central banks inﬂation objective p), i.e. ˆ pt+1 = pt+1 p, where pt+1 is the
inﬂation rate of period t+1. Thus, next period’s inﬂation is positively related to current
inﬂation and to the current output gap. All other inﬂuences are captured by the residual
hp
t+1.
Second, the link between the output gap and the monetary policy instrument, which
is assumed to be the short term nominal interest rate, is described by an IS-curve rela-
3tionship of the form:
(2) yt+1 = dt+1yt  gt+1(ˆ it   ˆ pt)+h
y
t+1
The short term nominal interest rate is also measured in deviations from the long
run average ¯ i, i.e. ˆ it = it   ¯ i, where it is the actual nominal rate. The output gap of
next period is positively related to the current output gap and negatively related to the







t+1 are assumed to be i.i.d. shocks with zero mean and
variances s2
hp and s2
hy. All model parameters are assumed to be stochastic, so they
can be interpreted as i.i.d. random variables with means E[at+1] = a, E[bt+1] = b,





The central bank sets its instrument ˆ it to minimize the discounted future loss caused
by deviations of inﬂation and output from their targets that it expects given current








over all possible paths fˆ ijg¥
j=t. Et[] denotes the conditional expectation operator and
0  w < 1 is the central banks discount factor. The weight that the central bank puts on
output stabilization relative to inﬂation stabilization is given by ly 0. The loss function
has the usual quadratic structure. For we use the normalized variables for inﬂation and
output gap, the central banks optimization problem is a version of the standard linear
regulator problem as described for example by Ljungqvist and Sargent (2004) that is
modiﬁed for multiplicative uncertainty and can be resolved by dynamic programming
methods. Since the model has a simple one-lag structure, the resulting optimal interest
rate rule is of the Taylor (1993) form. In this framework, Söderström (2002) shows that
for ly > 0, uncertainty about the inﬂation persistence parameter at+1 leads to a more
aggressive optimal monetary policy than under certainty. For ly = 0, however, optimal
policy is found to be certainty equivalent.
43 Normalization and the Independence Condition
Next, it is demonstrated, how normalization, as it is done by demeaning the variables pt
and it in the Söderström (2002) analysis, alters the covariances between model param-
eters and residuals. Let the Söderström model (1), (2) be given in a non-normalized
form (henceforth called the original model):
(4) pt+1 = at+1pt +bt+1yt +ep
t+1
(5) yt+1 = dt+1yt  gt+1(it  pt)+e
y
t+1
Here, the original residuals are denoted by ep
t+1 and e
y
t+1 to emphasize the difference
to residuals of the normalized model. We do not impose any restrictions on covariances,
so these may be given as sab, saep, sbep, sgd, sgey and sdey. Moreover, given are the
long run average values of inﬂation (p) and the central bank’s instrument (¯ i  0). To
guarantee, that these values together with a long run output gap of zero are indeed the
long run average values of the model, they need to equal the steady state values implied
by (4) and (5). This means, that the long run values must make the model equations
hold in the absence of any stochastic shocks. Hence, the unconditional expectations for
the additive shocks are determined by:
(6) ep = (1 a)p
(7) ey = g(¯ i p)
We now perform the normalization procedure like Söderström, bringing Model (4),
(5) into its equivalent form
(4’) pt+1 p = at+1(pt  p)+bt+1yt +at+1p p+ep
t+1
5(5’) yt+1 = dt+1yt  gt+1(it  ¯ i (pt  p))+gt+1(p ¯ i)+e
y
t+1






t+1 = gt+1(p ¯ i)+e
y
t+1











since the residuals now explicitly depend on some of the model parameters, some of the
covariances will be affected. While all other covariances remain stable, the covariance
between the inﬂation persistence parameter at+1 and the inﬂation-shock becomes
(10) sahp = ps2
a +saep
and the covariance between the monetary policy transmission parameter gt+1 and the
output gap-shock is now
(11) sghy = (p ¯ i)s2
g +sgey
It follows from (10) that in case of p > 0 and with uncertainty about at+1, i.e. s2
a >
0, the inequality sahp > saep holds. Thus, it can be seen that normalization changes
the residuals such that the covariance between at+1 and the inﬂation shock increases in
comparison to the original model.3
If, for example, we start with the original model (4) and (5) on which we impose
the condition that all model parameters and residuals are pairwise independent (this
condition will henceforth be called the “independence condition”), then normalization
leads to a non-zero covariance between the parameter at+1 and the new inﬂation shock
of sahp = ps2
a, which increases with the uncertainty about inﬂation persistence. As
3I focus on sahp, because this paper is concerned with uncertainty about inﬂation persistence. The
following arguments can be stated in analogous form for the covariance sghy.
6mentioned earlier, a non-zero covariance like this can change the implications of param-
eter uncertainty on optimal policy.
It is also of importance to notice that (10) implies the following: If the independence
condition is assumed for the normalized model (1), (2) as in Söderström (2002), the
covariance saep is equal to  ps2
a which is negative if p > 0 and s2
a > 0.
It thus follows:
1. The main point of this section is of a general methodological nature: Normalizing
of variables needs to be done carefully, for it can have non-trivial consequences.
Here, these consequences affect the stochastic properties of the model’s parame-
ters and residuals and hence the solution of the central bank’s optimization prob-
lem. For the implications of uncertainty about the inﬂation persistence parameter
on optimal monetary policy it is important whether the postulation of the inde-
pendence condition or normalization is done ﬁrst.
2. If the independence condition is imposed before normalization, the normalized
model will, in general, show some non-zero covariances (except in some special
cases, like p = ¯ i = 0 in the example above).
3. If the independence condition is imposed after normalization, the original non-
normalized model will, in general, show some non-zero covariances (except in
some special cases, like p = ¯ i = 0 in the example above).
4. Since non-zero covariances may alter the implications of parameter uncertainty,
it is interesting to explore the consequences of imposing the independence condi-
tion before normalization for the implications of uncertainty about the dynamics
of inﬂation. A positive covariance between inﬂation persistence parameter and
inﬂation-shock may suggest a more aggressive policy. This will be analyzed in the
next section.
4 Optimal Monetary Policy when Inﬂation Persistence is
Random
Let the original model (4), (5) be assumed to fulﬁll the independence condition. After
demeaning the variables as described in the previous section, we obtain the model (1),
(2) with residuals given by (6) and (9) and covariances equaling zero, except sahp =
ps2
a and sghy = (p ¯ i)s2
g .
7For deriving the optimal monetary policy rule, it is convenient to write the model in
state-space representation:














































and diagonal covariance matrix Se.
















is the central bank’s preference matrix. Deﬁning the
value function Jt(xt) as










we can formulate the following Bellman equation that is to be solved:






The solution of (15) can be obtained using the conjecture-and-verify approach.
In contrast to the standard linear regulator problem under multiplicative uncertainty
where the model’s parameters and residuals are orthogonal, normalization has made
the covariances sahp and sghy differ from zero and hence, the guess of the value func-
tion will need allowance for an additional ﬁrst order term. This approach and the fol-
lowing solution method is general applicable to dynamic programming problems with
non-orthogonal parameter uncertainty.
So we conjecture that the value function will take the form Jt(xt)=xt
0C1xt+c2
0xt+c3,
where C1 is a constant 2x2-matrix, c2 is a constant vector and c3 is a constant scalar. For
zero covariances, the ﬁrst order term c2
0 will be the zero vector. It is shown in the





























































(jk) denotes the element of C1 in the j’th row and k’th column. From the
right hand side of (16), the necessary ﬁrst order condition for the optimization problem
can be derived by differentiating with respect to ˆ it using the rules for the differentiating




















So the optimal interest rate rule becomes:
(18)








































Labeling the ﬁrst element of the vector f2 by fp and the second element by fy, allows
a representation of the optimal feedback rule in the format of the Taylor (1993) rule:
(21) ˆ it = f1+ fp  ˆ pt + fyyt
To solve for the unknown constants C1, c2 and c3, one has to put the feedback rule


















































































By comparison of coefﬁcients, we have the following three equations which can be

















































































Due to the non-linearity of the ﬁrst two equations, an analytical solution is not avail-
able. Instead, the solution can be obtained by numerical methods for any given set of
model parameters. First, iterating on (23) until convergence gives the matrix C1, which
can be inserted into equation (24). Second, iterating on (24) until convergence leads to
the vector c2. Finally, given C1 and c2, c3 can be derived from (25).
Next, we compute the optimal policy interest rate rule ˆ it = f1+ fp  ˆ pt + fyyt where
there is only uncertainty about at+1, using the parameter setting of Söderström (2002),
that is a = 1, b = 0:34, g = 0:4, d = 0:77, s2
a = 0:1, s2
b = s2
g = s2
d = 0 and w = 0:99 and
letting the preference values ly vary from 0 to 2.4 The long run averages p and ¯ i can
be chosen arbitrarily (however, we should restrict them to take strictly positive values)
but need to be ﬁxed for the simulations. The following calculation is based on values
p = 2 and ¯ i = 4. The shock variances s2
ep and s2
ey are set to unity.
The resulting optimal interest rate rules are visualized by ﬁgures 1, 2 and 3. The ﬁrst
two ﬁgures show the reaction coefﬁcients fy (to the actual output gap) and fp (to actual
inﬂation). Both exhibit exactly the same properties as in Söderström (2002): They are
declining with increasing weight on output stabilization ly and for any strictly positive
ly, both reaction coefﬁcients are higher under parameter uncertainty than under cer-
4Söderström chooses these parameter values on the basis of the euro-zone estimates of Orphanides
and Wieland (2000).
11tainty equivalence. The optimal central bank reaction to deviations from target is thus
more aggressive when uncertainty about the dynamics of inﬂation is taken into account.
Figure 1: Reaction coefﬁcient on current output gap
Figure 2: Reaction coefﬁcient on actual inﬂation
Whereas under strict inﬂation targeting (ly =0) the reaction coefﬁcients remain cer-
tainty equivalent, the optimal feedback rule’s intercept f1 does not, as can be seen in
ﬁgure 3. This intercept f1 can be interpreted as a measure for the the optimal devia-
tion of the neutral policy rate from the long run average ¯ i. The neutral policy rate is
12Figure 3: Neutral interest rate deviation from long run average
measured by the policy interest rate that is set when inﬂation and the output gap are
at target. Under certainty equivalence, this rate equals the long run average ¯ i, whereas
uncertainty about the inﬂation persistence parameter at+1 causes a positive deviation.
In Söderström’s setting, the neutral rate equals the long run average under parameter
uncertainty as well. This can also be seen in equations (19) and (24) which determine
the optimal neutral rate: If the covariances sahp and sghy are zero, both equations are





and f1 = 0.
The positive deviation in our case is different from zero for all values of ly, especially
for the strict inﬂation targeting case ly =0. So in the case of strict inﬂation targeting, the
central bank indeed reacts to deviations of inﬂation or output from target in the same
way it would in a world of certainty, but these reactions take place on a higher average
level. Concretely, with the chosen parameter setting and with ly =0, the optimal interest
rule under parameter uncertainty becomes ˆ it = 2:9+8:35 ˆ pt +4:42yt, so the neutral
interest rate is 2:9 percentage points above the long run average ¯ i. This result can be
interpreted as larger aggressiveness in the sense of a more “hawkish” policy: For any
given values of pt and yt, the central bank chooses a higher policy rate than under
certainty equivalence, thus ﬁghting inﬂation more strongly.
The reason is, that there is a positive covariance between the inﬂation persistence
parameter and the additive inﬂation shock. This covariance increases with higher un-
certainty and leads to a speciﬁc asymmetry with respect to additive inﬂation shocks:
If a positive inﬂation shock moves inﬂation above target, inﬂation persistence will, on
13average, increase thus inﬂation is likely to stay away from target for a longer time.
If a negative inﬂation shock decreases inﬂation below the target, inﬂation persistence
will, on average, be lower, so the downwards-shock fades out more quickly than an
upwards-shock. Hence, it is optimal to lean asymmetrically against shocks and thus
setting interest rates on average higher than under certainty equivalence. This result
reconciles the Söderström (2002) study with the ﬁndings by Craine (1979). The “hawk-
ish” neutral stance under inﬂation persistence uncertainty corresponds to Craine’s lower
average money growth under uncertainty about the persistence of output.
5 Discussion and Application
In this section I will return to the question whether independence should be imposed
before or after the model is normalized. Obviously, the answer is arbitrary. Both ap-
proaches just assume a certain covariance between the inﬂation persistence parameter
and the additive inﬂation shock of the original model (4), (5): The ﬁrst approach as-
sumes that saep = 0 and the second one implies saep =  ps2
a. However, the analysis
has shown that the second assumption implies precisely that covariance that makes the
long run average interest rate the optimal neutral one.
In fact, any other value for saep will lead to an optimal policy interest rate rule
under parameter uncertainty that differs from the certainty equivalent case. This can
be shown by calculating the coefﬁcients for the optimal rule for different values of
saep. Although this argument is true for all values of ly, we will restrict our analysis
to the case of strict inﬂation targeting. Figure 4 shows the optimal value of f1 under
uncertainty about at+1 (the dotted line) in comparison with the horizontal zero-line that
represents the optimal f1 under certainty about at+1. ly is set to zero and saep increases
from  0:31 to 0:31 (This interval covers the range for saep that is, given the variances
s2
a = 0:1 and s2




0:1]). Note that the coefﬁcients fp and fy
remain constant at their certainty equivalent values.
It can be seen, that f1 increases monotonically with growing saep and that it is
therefor different from zero except for the Söderström (2002) case, where saep =  p
s2
a =  0:2. This case is marked by a vertical dashed line. A second vertical dashed line
indicates the “independence before normalizing” case, where saep = 0. The “hawkish”
neutral monetary policy stance is thus representative for all values of saep higher than
 p s2
a. For all values of saep lower than  p s2
a, optimal policy is less aggressive:
The neutral policy rate is below the long run average ¯ i, so that for any given values of
pt and yt the central bank chooses a lower policy rate than under certainty equivalence.
In this case it is optimal to ﬁght inﬂation less aggressively - and parameter uncertainty
14Figure 4: Neutral interest rate for different covariance values
supports the “doves”.
We can draw the following conclusions: As soon as any independence assumption
is made, a certain covariance between inﬂation persistence parameter and inﬂation
shock is implied. In general, this covariance leads to optimal monetary policy under
uncertainty about inﬂation persistence that is not certainty equivalent, even in the strict
inﬂation targeting case. The optimal neutral stance of monetary policy differs from
the long run average rate which is the optimal neutral interest rate under certainty
equivalence. Thus, as long as the covariance is not assumed to equal exactly the only
value that leads to certainty equivalence, uncertainty about the persistence of inﬂation
may make the central bank ﬁghting inﬂation more or less aggressively. The direction
depends on the exact value of the covariance.
This result emphasizes the central importance of specifying the covariance. First,
the value of the covariance should generally be rather determined empirically than set
ad hoc. Second, even if the demeaned model (1), (2) with the independence prop-
erty is regarded as adequate, any other normalization than demeaning will change the
covariance between inﬂation persistence parameter and inﬂation shock and thus the
implications of uncertainty on optimal monetary policy.
This provides a set of possible applications for the analysis conducted in this pa-
per. For example, assume that the central bank wishes to change its inﬂation target as
recently suggested by Blanchard et al. (2010). The authors recommend to rise the in-
ﬂation target from its conventional value of 2 percent to 4 percent. This would enlarge
15the scope of monetary policy, because a higher inﬂation target should lead to a higher
average nominal interest rate and thus provide the the central bank with more room for
reactions to large economic shocks, like those that occurred during the ﬁnancial crisis
of 2007-2009.
In our framework, a regime shift from an inﬂation target of 2 percent to a higher
inﬂation target of 4 percent can be modeled as follows: We start with an economy that
is characterized by equations (1) and (2) where inﬂation is normalized by subtracting
the old inﬂation target of 2 percent and the nominal interest rate is normalized by
subtraction of the long run average value of 4 percent. The model is assumed to fulﬁll
the independence condition. Now, the central bank raises it’s inﬂation target to the
value of 4 percent. To compute the new optimal policy rule, the inﬂation variable is
transformed by a further subtraction of 2 percentage points while the nominal interest
rate variable remains unchanged. This procedure technically corresponds to setting
up model (4), (5) with ep = ey = 0 and independence property and then normalizing
it as in section 4, but with p = 2 and ¯ i = 0. As this new normalization increases the
covariance between inﬂation persistence parameter and inﬂation shock, a higher neutral
stance than under certainty equivalence is to be expected. Calculating the optimal policy
interest rate rule for the higher inﬂation target gives the same reaction coefﬁcients as
before (see ﬁgures 1 and 2) and a neutral policy rate which is parallel shifted upwards
by 2 percentage points as it is illustrated in ﬁgure 5.
Whereas certainty equivalence indicates a one-by-one rise of the neutral rate with
the rise of the inﬂation target, inﬂation persistence uncertainty leads to an even higher
increase. Again, this is also true for the case of strict inﬂation targeting which even
shows the strongest effect. The analysis thus suggests that the monetary policy scope
Blanchard and his co-authors hope to gain will even be greater if parameter uncertainty
is taken into account. There are good arguments for assuming that this effect is not
only of theoretical nature. As Altissimo et al. (2006) summarize, inﬂation persistence
is substantially inﬂuenced by the anchoring of inﬂation expectations. Further, empiri-
cal research indicates that explicit inﬂation targets help to anchor inﬂation expectations
(see for example Gurkaynak et al., 2006). Hence, a regime shift toward a higher inﬂa-
tion target may disturb the anchoring of inﬂation expectations, and thus, increase the
uncertainty about the persistence of inﬂation.
There are, of course, also possible situations with opposing effect. Suppose, for
example, the central bank considers the historical average inﬂation rate as being too
high and announces an inﬂation target below this value. The reduction of the inﬂa-
tion target will lead to a decreasing covariance between inﬂation persistence parameter
and inﬂation shock and hence increasing parameter uncertainty may lead to a lower
16Figure 5: Neutral interest rate under a high inﬂation targeting regime
neutral stance than under certainty equivalence. We thus end up with an astonishing
cross-effect of inﬂation persistence uncertainty: If the monetary policy regime is shifted
toward a looser policy, it backs up the “hawks”, but for any change in direction of a
tighter regime, it gives support to the “doves”.
6 Concluding Remarks
This paper starts by indicating an apparent contradiction in the literature on the im-
pact of inﬂation persistence uncertainty on optimal monetary policy in the case of strict
inﬂation targeting. On the one hand, the ﬁndings by Craine (1979) imply greater ag-
gression, whereas Söderström (2002) ﬁnds certainty equivalence. These results are
reconciled by analyzing the deeper interrelations between normalization and indepen-
dence assumptions. It is shown, that the Söderström setup implies a certain condition
for the covariance between inﬂation persistence parameter and inﬂation shock, which
leads to the certainty equivalence result. However, any other value for the covariance
causes the optimal neutral policy interest rate to deviate from the long run average pol-
icy rate. This result brings the Söderström analysis again in line with Craine’s and is
17not restricted to the strict inﬂation targeting case. To emphasize the importance of this
effect on the optimal neutral stance, the modeling framework is applied to the recent
Blanchard et al. (2010) proposal, that advocates an increase in the inﬂation target from
2 to 4 percent. It is shown that this target shift in combination with inﬂation persis-
tence uncertainty leads to a higher neutral monetary policy stance than under certainty
equivalence. Conversely, for any reduction of the inﬂation target, inﬂation persistence
uncertainty would support a lower neutral stance.
It can be summarized that uncertainty about the persistence of inﬂation makes opti-
mal monetary policy in general not certainty equivalent and causes interesting diamet-
rical effects on the optimal neutral stance of monetary policy in the case of a change
in the inﬂation target: For any shift toward a tighter regime, uncertainty supports the
“doves” in the central bank’s decision committee, while for any loosening in the inﬂation
target it is on the side of the “hawks”.
18Appendix:
Derivation of equation (16):
Inserting the conjecture Jt(xt) = xt
0C1xt+c2
0xt+c3 into the Bellman equation (15) and
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Note that tr[] is the trace-operator, Sxt+1 is the conditional covariance matrix of xt+1
and C1
(jk) denotes the element of C1 in the j’th row and k’th column. In the last step,
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Here, Vart[] denotes the conditional variance-operator. Expanding the quadratic
matrix form (Axt+bˆ it +e)0C1(Axt+bˆ it +e) and rearranging gives the right hand side
of equation (16).
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